Who Bears the Greatest Responsibility for International Crimes? by deGuzman, Margaret M.
FIU Law Review 
Volume 15 
Number 1 Symposium: The Legal Legacy of the 




Who Bears the Greatest Responsibility for International Crimes? 
Margaret M. deGuzman 
Temple University Beasley School of Law, deguzman@temple.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Online ISSN: 2643-7759 
Recommended Citation 
Margaret M. deGuzman, Who Bears the Greatest Responsibility for International Crimes?, 15 FIU L. Rev. 
21 (2021). 
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.15.1.7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU 
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
4 - DEGUZMAN (DO NOT DELETE)  7/11/2021 12:10 PM 
 
 
WHO BEARS THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES? 
Margaret M. deGuzman* 
Among the many fascinating aspects of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL)’s legal legacy analyzed in Professor Jalloh’s excellent book, 
one of the most intriguing is the question of who bears the greatest 
responsibility for international crimes. The SCSL’s statute describes the 
Court’s “competence” as extending to “persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law” committed in that country’s decade-long civil war.1 As 
Professor Jalloh explains, the primary impetus for including this limitation 
was the desire of the Court’s creators to control costs.2 This aspect of the 
SCSL’s legacy may be particularly important because virtually all 
international courts and tribunals face similar resource constraints. As such, 
most such institutions have declared the intent to focus their efforts on 
persons most responsible for the worst crimes within their jurisdictions, 
regardless of whether such a limit appears in their statutes.3 The question of 
who bears the greatest responsibility for international crimes goes to the heart 
of the global justice project. In selecting defendants to prosecute, 
international courts co-constitute, along with the various actors who create 
and sustain international courts, the identity of the international criminal 
justice regime. For that reason, this essay argues that future courts should 
take great care in determining who bears the greatest responsibility for 
international crimes. 
Professor Jalloh’s book provides an excellent starting place for 
exploring the impact of the SCSL’s legacy on future determinations of who 
bears the greatest responsibility for international crimes. First, it analyzes the 
SCSL’s holdings regarding that Court’s “greatest responsibility” statutory 
provision, with trial chambers diverging as to whether it was intended as a 
limit on jurisdiction or a guide to prosecutorial discretion, and the Appeals 
 
* Margaret M. deGuzman is the James E. Beasley Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute 
for International Law and Public Policy at Temple University’s Beasley School of Law. 
1 Agreement Between the United Nations and Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.  
2 CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 62 
(2020). 
3 Id. at 135.  
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Chamber ultimately holding the latter. Professor Jalloh argues convincingly 
that the Appeals Chamber misinterpreted its statute in an effort—conscious 
or not—to reach the result it considered most practicable.4 Among other 
things, the judges seem to have feared that resources would be wasted if, after 
a long and expensive trial resulting in conviction, the accused was found not 
to be one of those most responsible.5 Professor Jalloh counters first by 
questioning the assumptions inherent in this reasoning, including that a 
determination could not be made earlier.6  More importantly, he deploys the 
cannons of statutory interpretation, including those in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, to demonstrate that the statute’s requirement of 
greatest responsibility was a limit on the Court’s personal jurisdiction, not 
simply a guide to the prosecutor’s discretion.7 For instance, the limitation’s 
placement in a provision entitled “competence” signaled an intent to create a 
binding requirement. 
Perhaps more important for the Court’s legacy than this question of 
statutory interpretation is the matter of how the SCSL interpreted the term 
“greatest responsibility.” After a thorough discussion of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this regard, Professor Jalloh concludes that the Court 
adopted the correct interpretation.  That is, the Court extended the reach of 
“persons bearing greatest responsibility” not only to persons in positions of 
leadership or authority in organizations that committed international crimes, 
but also to perpetrators of the more “wicked” crimes.8  
Professor Jalloh’s excellent analysis of the work of the SCSL with 
regards to the “greatest responsibility” provision, raises at least two important 
issues for the work of future courts and tribunals: first, whether such 
provisions should be included in international court statutes, and second, 
assuming such limits are adopted, either by statute or through prosecutorial 
policy, how should “greatest responsibility” be interpreted? In the remainder 
of this essay, I offer some thoughts about each of these questions, answering 
the first in the negative, and suggesting that the latter should take account of 
institutional goals and values. 
First, assuming Professor Jalloh is right that the SCSL’s greatest 
responsibility provision was a jurisdictional limit on the Court’s reach, those 
establishing future courts should avoid such limits. International crimes are 
often committed by persons acting within organizations, such as military 
groups, and it is generally appropriate for international courts to focus on the 
 
4 Id. at 137–46. 
5 Id. at 135. 
6 Id. at 136. 
7 Id. at 140–42.  
8 Id. at 112. 
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leaders of such groups in allocating responsibility and imposing punishment. 
For instance, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was right to 
focus on the Nazi leadership, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia appropriately adjudicated the crimes of those most responsible 
within the Khmer Rouge leadership. Beyond the top leaders of criminal 
organizations, however, it is very difficult to determine who bears greatest 
responsibility for crimes. What does it mean for crimes to be particularly 
“wicked,” “heinous,” or otherwise “grave”? As I have written elsewhere, 
these are complex concepts that do not lend themselves easily to consistent 
interpretation and application.9 Yet inconsistent application can undermine a 
Court’s legitimacy. 
The situation in Sierra Leone illustrates this point. Unlike the Nazis and 
Khmer Rouge, there was no single organization that bore greatest 
responsibility for the crimes committed in the conflict in Sierra Leone. 
Instead, there were several organizations that committed crimes of various 
kinds and to various degrees. The SCSL’s first prosecutor adopted a strategy 
of prosecuting a small number of leaders from each of the three principal 
organizations. In his view, this approach best illustrated the kinds of crimes 
committed and expressed condemnation of those crimes to the broadest 
audiences, particularly to victims.10 This approach was controversial. In 
particular, it raised the question whether, by spreading prosecutions among 
the three organizations, the prosecutor inappropriately telegraphed a moral 
equivalency among them. In fact, two of the groups had committed many 
more serious crimes than had the third. Another approach consistent with the 
goal of prosecuting “persons bearing greatest responsibility” would have 
been to select the organization responsible for the most widespread crimes 
and prosecute a greater number of leaders from that organization.  
A similar controversy arose at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (ECCC), which has similar language in its constitutive 
document.11 The ECCC’s co-prosecutors agreed on the top ten defendants, 
but when the international co-prosecutor sought to expand the number of 
defendants, the Cambodian prosecutor demurred, asserting that additional 
 
9 See MARGARET M. DEGUZMAN, SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY: GRAVITY AND THE 
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2020). 
10 David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience, 15 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 3 (2008) (describing the indictments of RUF, CDF, and AFRC leaders).  
11 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with inclusion of 
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006, art. 1 [hereinafter “Law on 
ECCC”]. 
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defendants were beyond the Court’s mandate.12 This decision was broadly 
attacked as political given that the Cambodian government opposed 
including the new defendants for fear it would be implicated in their cases.13 
The difficulty of identifying the scope of “those who were most 
responsible”14 inhibited effective argument on both sides of this debate. 
In light of such difficulties of interpretation and application, therefore, 
those creating courts and tribunals should avoid including jurisdictional 
requirements limiting personal jurisdiction based on degree of responsibility. 
As a policy matter, on the other hand, it is entirely appropriate, indeed 
important in many cases, for international courts and tribunals to focus their 
efforts on those they believe bear particular responsibility for the most 
serious crimes in the situation. In fact, this is standard practice in many 
national prosecutor’s offices. If a prosecutor is unable to prosecute all those 
responsible due to resources or other constraints, she will typically seek to 
adjudicate the cases of those highest up the ladder, often by obtaining the 
cooperation of those below them.  
Given that most international courts and tribunals will seek to prosecute 
those they deem most responsible for the international crimes in their 
jurisdictions, it is important for such institutions to develop procedures for 
identifying such individuals. Such procedures will largely be a matter of 
prosecutorial policy, although in some courts, including the ICC, 
prosecutorial selection decisions are subject to review in some circumstances. 
Additionally, the bodies that govern international courts, like the ICC’s 
Assembly of States Parties, should play a part in developing the procedures 
for identifying the most responsible defendants.  
In determining who bears greatest responsibility, such actors should 
endeavor to align their decision-making with articulated institutional goals 
and priorities. This is the best way to ensure the effectiveness of international 
criminal law’s institutions. Effectiveness requires the identification and 
application of goals and priorities, against which the institution’s actions can 
be measured.15 In some situations, the answer to the question who bears 
greatest responsibility may be intuitively obvious. A president who directed 
the apparatus of the state to commit genocide surely is one of those most 
 
12 Cambodia: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - New International Co-
Prosecutor Should Commit to Fulfilling the Tribunal’s Mandate, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 4, 2009), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/44000/asa230222009en.pdf.  
13 See, e.g., Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Convictions ‘Too Little, Too Late’, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/08/cambodia-khmer-rouge-convictions-too-little-
too-late.  
14 Law on ECCC, supra note 11. 
15 Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 
AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 230 (2012).  
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responsible for the ensuing crimes. Often, however, a more nuanced 
understanding of what an institution seeks to achieve is necessary to make 
the greatest responsibility determination. The ICC, for instance, could set as 
an institutional goal to address the needs for justice of a certain victim 
population. This goal would likely counsel adjudicating a rather broader set 
of perpetrators in the situation than the Court would if its goal were to express 
global condemnation of a select set of crimes. 
The process of formulating goals and priorities and using them in 
determining who bears greatest responsibility should be a dynamic one. 
Prosecutors should be careful not to adopt inflexible policies in this regard 
since institutional goals and priorities change over time. Moreover, 
international courts and tribunals should seek to engage a wide spectrum of 
their constituencies in this process. Whether explicitly in policy statements, 
or implicitly in their selection decisions, international courts and tribunals 
express their goals and priorities to such audiences, who then react. The 
institutions should take account of such reactions as they continue the 
process. In this way, the institutions and their supporters co-create norms 
about who bears the greatest responsibility, and thus contribute to the gradual 
development of international criminal law.  
 
